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Abstract  
The SEC’s Securities Offering Reform (SOR) was intended to address information 
problems prior to Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEO), thereby mitigating the 
problem of SEO overpricing. Consistent with the propensity of overpricing 
increasing with idiosyncratic stock return volatility (IVOL), we find greater capital 
market benefits from SOR for high IVOL issuers. Counter to concerns that SOR 
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following SOR, even among high IVOL issuers. 
Keywords: Securities Offering Reform, Seasoned Equity Offerings, Idiosyncratic 
Volatility, Market Conditioning. 
JEL Codes: G14, G32, G38, M40 
* Corresponding author. Address for correspondence: Danial R. Hemmings, Bangor Business School, Hen 
Goleg, College Road, Bangor, UK, LL57 2DG. Phone: +44 01248 38 8162. E-mail: d.hemmings@bangor.ac.uk
1 
1. Introduction 
This paper investigates whether the effects of the SEC’s Securities Offering Reform (SOR) on 
share price efficiency at the time of Seasoned Equity Offerings (SEOs) varies with 
idiosyncratic stock return volatility (IVOL). Enacted in late 2005, SOR relaxed historic gun-
jumping restrictions, which prohibited certain information disclosures prior to SEOs. The gun-
jumping provisions were intended to protect investors from market conditioning,1 however 
they also prevented the timely dissemination of accurate information demanded by investors.2
Thus, while SOR may yield improvements in market efficiency, via an enhancement in the pre-
SEO disclosure environment, it may also enable firms to engage in greater market conditioning. 
Since the propensity for mispricing varies across stocks, we examine for differences in the 
effects of SOR based on IVOL, since the propensity for mispricing is expected to be greater 
for high IVOL stocks. 
A long literature documents the apparent propensity for SEOs to coincide with overpricing of 
issuers’ stock (Baker & Wurgler, 2012; Wang et al., 2013). In particular, SEOs are preceded 
by pronounced share price appreciation, and followed by return underperformance. An 
enhanced pre-SEO information environment can promote greater stock price efficiency, 
thereby reducing the scope for mispricing by the market. Increased disclosure levels are 
associated with reductions in information asymmetry (Diamond & Verrecchia, 1991) and 
information risk (Healy and Palepu, 2001). The availability of better information should reduce 
the propensity for speculation in the market (Baker & Wurgler, 2006) and bring stock prices 
closer to fundamental values (Gao, 2008). Following SOR, Clinton et al. (2014) find significant 
improvements in the pre-SEO information environment, including increases in disclosure 
volumes and quality, and that SOR led to capital formation benefits. Similarly, Shroff et al. 
(2013) find that SOR reduced information asymmetry, and consequently, issuers’ cost of 
capital. 
The capital market benefits of SOR, however, should not be homogeneous across issuers, as 
assumed by Clinton et al. (2014) and Shroff et al. (2013), since the underlying probability of 
overpricing is not constant for all stocks. In particular, speculative stock attributes, such as high 
IVOL, attract retail investors who have a greater propensity to gamble (Kumar, 2009; Han & 
1 Opponents of the reform feared that greater discretion over the release of pre-SEO disclosures would enable 
issuers to engage in market conditioning, or ‘hyping’, whereby self-touting voluntary disclosures are used to 
increase investor demand for the offering (Morrissey, 2006). 
2 See the Securities Offering Reform Final Rule at http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8591.pdf. 
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Kumar, 2013). IVOL also acts as a pervasive constraint on arbitrage activity, which may 
otherwise correct prices towards fundamental values. Indeed, Pontiff (2006, p. 49) argues that 
IVOL “appears to be the single largest impediment to market efficiency”. To the extent that 
SOR led to improvements in market efficiency, we hypothesise, and show, that the benefits of 
SOR are greater for issuers with higher IVOL.  
Furthermore, since market conditioning relates to the elicitation of increased investor demand 
through overly-optimistic pre-SEO disclosures (Lang & Lundholm, 2000), notable price effects 
are more likely for stocks with a greater propensity for mispricing. Shroff et al. (2013) conduct 
tests for systematic effects of market conditioning, without adjustment for expected differences 
in the propensity for mispricing, and obtain insignificant results but which do “[point] in the 
direction of hyping” (p. 1324). They concede that their tests suffer from low power. As an 
additional test, therefore, we examine the impact of SOR on market conditioning, taking IVOL 
into account.  
Our study makes two main contributions to the literature. First, we add to a handful of papers 
examining the impact of SOR, and, to our knowledge, we are the first to examine how the 
effects of the reform vary with speculative stock attributes. Importantly, we demonstrate that 
the benefits of SOR for high IVOL stocks are likely to be greater than previously demonstrated. 
Secondly, we contribute to the literature on opportunistic disclosure by testing for market 
conditioning by conducting tests which account for IVOL. Counter to commentators’ concerns 
(e.g., Morrissey, 2006), we find no evidence of market conditioning following the reform, even 
for high IVOL stocks.  
2. Data 
We obtain a sample of SEOs (public offers) announced between January 1, 2000, and 
December 31, 2011, from the Bloomberg New Issues database. The Securities Offering Reform 
became effective on December 1, 2005, approximately mid-way through the sample period. 
We exclude rights-offerings and pure secondary offerings from the sample. We obtain issuers’ 
CIK codes from Thomson One Banker, and use these to merge with 8-K filings data from 
EDGAR. We obtain firm-level returns and financial data from Datastream and Worldscope, 
respectively. Fama-French factors are obtained from Kenneth French’s website. The final 
sample consists of 2,653 SEO announcements. 
3. Methodology 
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3.1. Key variable definitions 
We estimate abnormal returns using the Fama-French three factor model as our benchmark 
model for expected returns, similarly to Teoh et al. (1998). We estimate Eq. (1) over a 12-
month estimation window for each event, between 18 months and 6 months prior to the SEO 
announcement (t = -391, -131): 
The abnormal return (AR) for company i is given by: 
We then measure cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) as follows: 
Where (t=n, t=m) is the event window. We apply both pre-SEO (-130, -6) and post-SEO (+6, 
+391) event windows within our analyses, where (t=0) is the SEO announcement date. 
Heterogeneous effects of the reform are examined by taking into account the prevailing 
idiosyncratic volatility of issuers’ stock (IVOL). We measure IVOL as the root mean squared 
error (RMSE) of Eq. (1), as per Eq. (4) below: 
High values of IVOL are associated with higher information uncertainty (Barth et al., 2017), 
and greater arbitrage constraints (Pontiff, 2006). Stocks with high levels of IVOL are therefore 
expected to be more prone to mispricing. We expect improvements in price efficiency 
following the reform to be most pronounced for high IVOL stocks. 
In order to test for market conditioning (stock hyping) by issuers releasing overly-optimistic 
pre-SEO disclosures, we first measure SRETd as the CAR over the three-day window (-1, +1) 
around each discretionary 8-K disclosure made in the 6-month pre-SEO window. Similarly to 
Shroff et al. (2013), we base our tests for market conditioning on Sum of SRETd, being the 
aggregate SRETd for all pre-SEO discretionary disclosures by the issuer. It is suggested by Lang 
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and Lundholm (2000), Rogers et al. (2011), and Huang et al. (2014) that firms are incentivised 
to opportunistically manage discretionary disclosures. 
We estimate the mean value of Sum of SRETd to be significantly positive at 1.17% (T-stat = 
4.50). Higher values of Sum of SRETd, however, do not necessarily reflect market conditioning, 
as fundamental information may simply be better for some issuers. We therefore orthogonalize 
Sum of SRETd to returns on issuers’ mandatory 8-K disclosures (Sum of SRETm), as well as a 
number of firm-level financial indicators and industry-year fixed effects. Our final measure of 
market conditioning (CONDT) is the residual ( ) from cross-sectional regressions of Eq. (5) 
below: 
In order to control for issuers’ fundamentals, Eq. (5) includes: market-to-book ratio (M/B), 
logarithm of market value of equity (Size), return on assets ratio (ROA), and Tobin’s Q (TQ), 
all at the most recent year-end prior to the offering announcement. If pre-SEO discretionary 
disclosures are overly positive, then we expect Sum of SRETd to be higher than predicted by 
the model (Eq. 5), and therefore the residual (CONDT) would be positive. 
3.2. Empirical models 
We evaluate the capital market benefits of SOR by examining whether the reform mitigates 
pre-SEO stock price run-ups, and post-SEO return reversal, commonly thought to be hallmarks 
of SEO overpricing. We therefore model the pre-SEO (-130, -6) and post-SEO (+6, +391) CAR 
using the following multiple regression models: 
Eq. (6) relates to the pre-SEO CAR, while Eq. (7) relates to the post-SEO CAR, including the 
possible reversal of market conditioning in pre-SEO disclosures (CONDT). We test possible 
effects of SOR by inclusion of a Postref dummy variable, equal to 1 (0) for SEO 
announcements made after (up to and including) 2005, as well as a series of interactions. Both 
models include controls for: market-to-book ratio (M/B), logarithm of market value of equity 
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(Size), return on assets ratio (ROA), and Tobin’s Q (TQ), all at the most recent year-end prior 
to the offering announcement, as well as industry fixed effects. We also employ alternative 
restricted specifications of Eq. (6) and Eq. (7) in our analyses.  
4. Results 
We present the results for the impact of SOR on pre-SEO returns in Table 1. The reduced model 
in column (1) shows that the reform was associated with a significant overall reduction in the 
pre-SEO CAR by approximately 4.8% over the six-month pre-SEO announcement period. 
Thus, if the pre-SEO share price run-up is reflective of SEO overpricing, this suggests that the 
reform led to an overall increase in price efficiency. The results in columns (2)-(3) however 
demonstrate that, as predicted, the effects of the reform are greater for issuers with higher 
IVOL. Specifically, we observe a positive and significant coefficient on IVOL in column (3), 
consistent with the notion that high IVOL stocks experienced a greater pre-SEO run-up prior 
to the reform, however we also find a negative coefficient on the Postref*IVOL interaction, 
significant at the 10% level, which suggests smaller differences between high and low IVOL 
stocks following the reform. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
We present results from regressions on the post-SEO CAR (firstly, excluding CONDT and its 
interactions) in Table 2. The reduced model in column (2) reports a significantly negative 
coefficient on IVOL, consistent with the notion that high IVOL issuers experience greater 
overpricing, and thus a more pronounced reversal following the SEO. The negative coefficient 
on Postref in columns (1) and (3), however, suggests that average post-SEO return performance 
across issuers has deteriorated following the reform. This may reflect a greater reduction in 
issuers’ cost of capital, given the richer information environment facilitated by the reform 
(Clinton et al., 2014). In model (3) of Table 2, we observe a positive and significant coefficient 
on the Postref*IVOL interaction, which, taken together with the negative coefficient on this 
term in column (3) of Table 1, suggests that overpricing of high IVOL stocks at SEO is reduced 
after the reform. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
In order to test for the effects of the reform on market conditioning, we estimate the full 
specification of Eq. (7) and present the results in Table 3. In columns (1) and (2), before 
including IVOL and its interactions, we obtain results consistent with Shroff et al. (2013), i.e., 
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no significant evidence of return reversal to CONDT in the aggregate. In column (4), we include 
interactions with IVOL to examine whether the results differ across this dimension. Since the 
full specification of Eq. (7) contains numerous interactions, we compute marginal effects of 
CONDT at representative values of IVOL to aide interpretation. Specifically, we estimate the 
marginal effects of CONDT following the reform, when IVOL situates on the 25th, 50th, and 
75th percentiles.3 In each case, we estimate the marginal effect of CONDT to be insignificantly 
positive, indicating no reversal of the abnormal return on pre-SEO filings, regardless of the 
level of IVOL. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
5. Conclusions 
We examine whether the effects of the SEC’s Securities Offering Reform (SOR) differ 
depending on issuers’ idiosyncratic volatility (IVOL). The reform introduced a more relaxed 
pre-SEO disclosure environment, which yielded a richer information environment (Clinton et 
al., 2014). We show that the informational benefits of the reform, in terms of more efficient 
market pricing, is greater for firms with higher IVOL. Higher IVOL is associated with greater 
information uncertainty (Barth et al., 2017), higher proportion of speculative investor types 
(Han & Kumar, 2013), and greater arbitrage constraints (Pontiff, 2006), and thus high IVOL 
stocks are more prone to overpricing. Importantly, our results indicate that the benefits of SOR 
for high IVOL issuers are likely to be greater than previously thought. Counter to 
commentators’ concerns, we find no evidence of issuers exploiting the flexibility afforded by 
conditioning the market, even when IVOL is high. While our tests for market conditioning are 
arguably more powerful than those of Shroff et al (2013), they are still limited in the sense that 
they do not consider disclosures’ qualitative characteristics. Overall, our findings contribute to 
the limited literature which demonstrates the beneficial effects of SOR. 
3 We calculate marginal effects as the sum of the coefficients on CONDT and Postref*CONDT plus the 
coefficients on IVOL*CONDT and Postref*IVOL*CONDT multiplied by the value of IVOL at the 25th, 50th, and 
75th percentile (IVOL = 1.54, 2.44, and 3.78). T-statistics presented below marginal effects are estimated using 
the delta-method.
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Table 1
Regressions on pre-SEO cumulative abnormal returns (-6 to 0 months).
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept 82.232*** 74.092*** 71.830***
(9.15) (7.37) (7.02)
Postref -4.802*** 0.700
(-3.66) (0.27)
IVOL 0.919 2.256**
(1.39) (2.23)
Postref*IVOL -2.009*
(-1.86)
Size -4.806*** -4.576*** -4.442***
(-9.54) (-8.46) (-8.14)
M/B 0.126 0.139 0.099
(0.85) (0.95) (0.68)
ROA 13.238** 17.248*** 15.441***
(2.29) (2.88) (2.65)
TQ 2.262*** 2.395*** 2.150***
(3.72) (3.92) (3.59)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.12 0.12 0.12
N 2,653 2,653 2,653
Our sample covers 2,653 Seasoned Equity Offerings between 2000 and 2011, where Postref is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 (0) for SEO announcements made after (up to and including) 2005. T-statistics are shown in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates, and are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test.
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Table 2
Regressions on post-SEO cumulative abnormal returns (0 to +18 months).
(1) (2) (3)
Intercept -2.222 44.208*** 49.321***
(-0.16) (2.89) (3.17)
Postref -5.026** -21.653***
(-2.09) (-4.22)
IVOL -5.640*** -9.339***
(-5.58) (-5.51)
Postref*IVOL 6.268***
(3.42)
Size -0.178 -2.664*** -2.280***
(-0.21) (-3.13) (-2.65)
M/B -0.422 -0.310 -0.300
(-1.43) (-1.08) (-1.06)
ROA 28.428*** 14.334 15.350*
(3.01) (1.57) (1.70)
TQ -3.620*** -3.584*** -3.293***
(-3.36) (-3.47) (-3.21)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.08 0.10 0.12
N 2,653 2,653 2,653
Our sample covers 2,653 Seasoned Equity Offerings between 2000 and 2011, where Postref is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 (0) for SEO announcements made after (up to and including) 2005. T-statistics are shown in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates, and are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test.
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Table 3
Regressions on post-SEO CAR: Tests for market conditioning
Dependent variable: Post-SEO cumulative abnormal returns (0 to +18 months)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Intercept -4.238 -3.900 42.404*** 48.687***
(-0.30) (-0.28) (2.79) (3.23)
CONDT 0.148 0.024 -0.224 -0.915**
(1.46) (0.13) (-1.00) (-2.31)
Postref*CONDT 0.187 0.850*
(0.83) (1.85)
IVOL*CONDT 0.082* 0.229**
(1.71) (2.57)
Postref*IVOL*CONDT -0.171*
(-1.66)
Postref -5.137** -23.424***
(-2.14) (-5.22)
IVOL -5.584*** -9.885***
(-5.83) (-7.47)
Postref*IVOL 6.911***
(4.41)
Baseline 0.109 0.114 0.106 0.102
(1.07) (1.11) (1.07) (1.02)
Size -0.276 -0.101 -2.590*** -2.167**
(-0.33) (-0.12) (-3.06) (-2.53)
M/B -0.400 -0.430 -0.308 -0.283
(-1.35) (-1.45) (-1.07) (-0.99)
ROA 29.372*** 27.673*** 13.714 13.468
(3.12) (2.92) (1.50) (1.48)
TQ -3.479*** -3.630*** -3.583*** -3.355***
(-3.22) (-3.36) (-3.47) (-3.24)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.12
N 2,653 2,653 2,653 2,653
Marginal effect of CONDT after the reform (i.e., Postref = 1):
Low IVOL: 25th percentile 0.025
(0.14)
Med IVOL: 50th percentile 0.078
(0.51)
High IVOL: 75th percentile 0.156
(1.29)
Our sample covers 2,653 Seasoned Equity Offerings between 2000 and 2011, where Postref is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 (0) for SEO announcements made after (up to and including) 2005. T-statistics are shown in 
parentheses below coefficient estimates, and are based on robust standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
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*, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively, based on a two-tailed test.
